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This paper provides an investigation of the role of momentum and social learning in sequential voting
systems. In the econometric model, voters are uncertain over candidate quality, and voters in late states
attempt to infer the information held by those in early states from voting returns. Candidates experience
momentum effects when their performance in early states exceeds expectations. The empirical application
focuses on the responses of daily polling data to the release of voting returns in the 2004 presidential
primary. We find that Kerry benefited from surprising wins in early states and took votes away from
Dean, who held a strong lead prior to the beginning of the primary season. The voting weights implied
by the estimated model demonstrate that early voters have up to 20 times the influence of late voters
in the selection of candidates, demonstrating a significant departure from the ideal of "one person,
one vote." We then address several alternative, non-learning explanations for our results. Finally, we
run simulations under different electoral structures and find that a simultaneous election would have
been more competitive due to the absence of herding and that alternative sequential structures would
have yielded different outcomes.
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While voting occurs simultaneously in many elections, voters choose sequentially in other cases,
such as in roll-call voting in legislatures and in general elections for many federal o￿ces prior to
1872. The most widely discussed example of a sequential election, however, is the Presidential
primary. As shown in Figure 1, the 2004 Democratic primary season began with the Iowa caucus
on January 19th, followed by the New Hampshire primary on January 27th, and then mini-Super
Tuesday on February 3rd, when voting occurred in the states of Arizona, Delaware, Missouri,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. The primary season continued with
various elections in March, April, and May before concluding with the Montana and New Jersey
primaries on June 8th. As shown in Figure 2, the 2008 schedule is becoming increasingly front-
loaded with Nevada scheduled between Iowa and New Hampshire and, perhaps more importantly,
many states moving their primaries to February 5th. While sequential aspects will likely remain
important, this front loading in the 2008 schedule has led to February 5 being dubbed a \national
primary."
When considering such changes in the primary schedule, one naturally wonders whether or not
the order of voting matters. That is, do outcomes of primaries depend upon the sequencing of
states? Relatedly, do sequential, relative to simultaneous, systems lead to di￿erent outcomes in
terms of the selection of candidates? And, if so, why? In our view, as well as the view of others,
the key distinction is that sequential, relative to simultaneous, elections provide late voters with
an opportunity to learn about the desirability of the various candidates from the behavior of
early voters. This opportunity for late voters to learn from early voting returns can in turn lead
to momentum e￿ects, de￿ned as a positive e￿ect of candidate performance in early states on
candidate performance in later states.
While conventional wisdom holds that such momentum e￿ects are important in sequential
elections, any econometric attempt to identify their existence and measure their magnitude faces
several challenges. First, what is the informational content of voting returns from early states? Do
the absolute returns matter or should results be measured relative to voter expectations regarding
candidate performance? If returns should be gauged relative to expectations, how can these
expectations be measured? Second, how should researchers account for unmeasured candidate
characteristics? The fact that eventual winners tend to do well in early states has often been
1interpreted as evidence of momentum e￿ects. But success in both early and late states could simply
re￿ect underlying candidate strength, which is often unobserved by the econometrician. Said
di￿erently, winners in early states might have won the overall primary even with a simultaneous
primary system under which momentum e￿ects play no role. Third, how do voters weigh the voting
returns from di￿erent states? For example, how should voters in states third in the sequence, such
as those in South Carolina, weigh the returns from Iowa, the ￿rst state, relative to those from
New Hampshire, the second state. A similar question is how do voters account for the fact that
voters in states earlier in the sequence might also condition on returns from even earlier states?
More concretely, when attempting to learn about the desirability of candidates from voting returns
in Iowa and New Hampshire, how do voters in South Carolina account for the fact that, before
casting their ballots, voters in New Hampshire may have also conditioned their decisions on voting
returns in Iowa?
In this paper we attempt to overcome these econometric challenges through the development of
a simple discrete choice econometric model of voting and social learning. In the model voters are
uncertain about candidate quality, which is valued by all voters regardless of their ideology and can
be interpreted, for example, as competence or integrity. Voters gather information about quality
during the campaign, and voters in late states attempt to uncover the information of early voters
from voting returns in these states. In the context of this model we show that candidates bene￿t
from momentum e￿ects when their performance in early states exceeds expectations. Momentum
is thus not exclusive to winners, who may actually experience reverse momentum e￿ects if their
margin of victory is smaller than expected. The degree of such momentum e￿ects depends upon
a variety of factors, including voters’ prior beliefs about the quality of candidates, expectations
about candidate performance, and the degree of variation in state-level preferences.
In order to estimate the degree of social learning in sequential elections, we examine voting
in the 2004 Democratic primaries. In particular, we examine reactions of respondents from late
states in daily polling data to the revelation of aggregate voting returns in early states. To
the extent that social learning is important, unexpected strength in voting returns from early
states should lead to improved candidate evaluation by voters in late states in the daily polling
data. The parameters of interest are those governing the social learning process and are chosen
to re￿ect the dynamics in the polling data. Our estimates demonstrate substantial momentum
e￿ects. Using the estimated model, we examine how implied voting weights di￿er depending upon
2location in the voting sequence. We next address several alternative, non-learning explanations
for our momentum results. Finally, we use the model to simulate electoral outcomes under a
counterfactual simultaneous election and also alternative primary calendars.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant theoretical and
empirical literature. Section 3 lays out the basic theoretical and econometric model of momentum
in primaries. Section 4 describes our empirical application, section 5 describes the counterfactual
simulations, and section 6 describes possible extensions and summarizes our key ￿ndings.
2 Literature Review
Welch (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), and Banerjee (1992) provide the ￿rst
formal analysis of social learning. Agents choose actions sequentially and are uncertain about the
correct action, which depends upon the state of the world. Payo￿s are thus correlated and agents
may attempt to learn the correct action from the behavior of others. If agents are su￿ciently
unsure about the true state of the world then they may ignore their private signals and simply
follow the actions of others. Such behavior has become known alternatively as informational
cascades or herding. Such cascades are fragile in the sense that small changes in early signals can
lead to large changes in subsequent behavior. Also, cascades can lead to ine￿cient outcomes if
realized early signals are outliers and thus not representative of the true state of the world.1
A key question is whether these social learning results extend to the context of sequential
elections, with the main distinction being that voters make a social choice, and individual payo￿s
thus depend upon the actions of all agents. Under strategic voting, rational agents recognize
that their individual action only matters if they are pivotal, de￿ned as situations in which their
vote changes the voting outcome. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) ￿rst address this issue in
the context of a model with a binary, symmetric, and simultaneous election. Given that pivotal
1 This social learning framework has been applied in a variety of empirical settings. Welch (2000), for example,
studies herding among security analysts. For a general overview of social learning in ￿nance, see Devenow and
Welch (1996). In development economics, social learning has been shown to play a key role in the choice of
technology, such as in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Munshi (2004). Cai, Chen, and Fang (2007) conduct a
￿eld experiment in which the top selling dishes were posted in restaurant menus and ￿nd that these postings are
in￿uential for orders and especially so for infrequent customers. Finally, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2007) provide a
social learning explanation for aggregation reversals, where an individual relationship, such as income and ideology,
is reversed at some level of aggregation, such as the state-level. For a more comprehensive overview of the social
learning literature, see the survey by Sushil, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) and Chamley (2004).
3voters are choosing candidates based upon their private signal, the selected candidate is the same
regardless of whether voters observe only their private information or whether all information is
public.2 Dekel and Piccione (2000) extend this result to sequential elections under binary and
symmetric environments and show that every equilibrium of the simultaneous game is also an
equilibrium of the sequential game, regardless of the sequence. Strategic voters condition on being
pivotal and hence behave as if they know that all other voters are evenly divided between the two
candidates. Thus there is a symmetry between early and late voters and it does not matter which
candidate is supported by the early voters. It is important to note, however, that this result does
not demonstrate an equivalence between simultaneous and sequential elections; due to multiplicity,
there are equilibria of the sequential game that are not equilibria of the simultaneous game. In
particular, Ali and Kartik (2006) construct an equilibrium in posterior-based voting in the context
of a sequential election. In this equilibrium if other voters play history dependent strategies then
it is individually optimal for each and every voter to do so as well even under strategic voting.
Intuitively, if all other voters condition on history then early votes are more informative than late
votes, breaking the symmetry underlying the Dekel and Piccione (2000) result. These posterior-
based strategies can be interpreted as sequential analogues to sincere voting under simultaneous
elections, providing support for our sincerity assumption to be described below.3
In addition to social learning, several authors have suggested alternative models for momen-
tum, both at the voter and candidate level. Callander (2007) proposes a model where every voter
gains utility from both conforming, de￿ned as supporting the eventual winner, and voting infor-
matively, de￿ned as supporting the best candidate based on their belief about the true state of
the world. As the number of voters increases, the conforming component of utility dominates
the information-based component and herding results, propelling the leading candidate to victory.
On the candidate side, Klumpp and Polborn (2006) specify a model in which an early primary
victory increases the likelihood of victory for one candidate and creates an asymmetry in campaign
spending that furthers this advantage. Starting with two symmetric candidates, if one candidate
randomly wins the ￿rst election, this winner will have a greater incentive to spend in subsequent
2 Speci￿cally, they state that as the size of the electorate goes to in￿nity the percentage of voters basing their
choice on their own private signal approaches zero. At the same time, the number of voters who vote based on
their private signal goes to in￿nity so that in large elections most privately held information is revealed.
3 In related work, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) show that momentum e￿ects can be generated even under
simultaneous elections if polling data or endorsements are released during the period leading up to the election.
4elections while the loser will have a diminished incentive. Through this asymmetry of campaign
spending, momentum is generated and can lead an early winner to overall victory. Finally, Strumpf
(2002) discusses a countervailing force to momentum. In particular, a candidate who is expected
to win several of the last elections can credibly commit to not dropping out of the race even if he
is trailing early. From the perspective of opposing candidates, this commitment both increases the
costs of running and decreases the probability of winning. This e￿ect, which favors later winners,
thus moves in the opposite direction of momentum, which favors early winners, and may make
measurement of either e￿ect more di￿cult.
Most of the empirical work on momentum has come from the political science literature. Bartels
(1987 and 1988) uses data from the National Election Study (NES) to predict the dynamics of the
1984 Democratic Primary. He shows that simple ratings of candidates do not ￿t the dynamics as
well as do models that include measures of candidate viability. He also suggests that candidate
Gary Hart’s surprising early victories convinced later voters of his viability. Adkins and Dowdle
(2001) use cross-primary variation to measure the importance of wins in the ￿rst two elections by
regressing overall primary shares on measures of primary outcomes in Iowa and New Hampshire.4
While we ￿nd these papers to be both interesting and suggestive of momentum e￿ects, they do not
fully overcome the econometric challenges described in the introduction. In order to better address
the challenges associated with measuring momentum e￿ects, we believe that it is desirable to build
an empirical model from microfoundations, and the next section provides such a framework for
measurement.
3 Theoretical framework
This section lays out our basic theoretical and econometric framework for measuring momentum
e￿ects in sequential elections, and the notation here follows Chamley (2002). Given our empirical
motivations, we keep things simple and make the assumptions necessary to generate a tractable
empirical model. Many of these assumptions, however, will be discussed and relaxed in the
4 There have also been experimental tests for momentum e￿ects. Morton and Williams (1999) consider a model
with three candidates, liberal, moderate, and conservative. Voters do not observe candidate ideology but can
potentially learn about ideology from past voting. Partisan voters (liberal or conservative) are risk averse and
thus would rather vote for the moderate if they believe that only the moderate and the opposing candidate have a
chance of winning. The authors test this hypotheses in a laboratory setting and ￿nd that later voters do use the
early results and that a sequential election increases the likelihood of victory for moderate, unknown candidates.
In addition, Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2005) test predictions of the sequential voting model of Battaglini
(2005), which incorporates costly voting and endogenous turnout.
5empirical section to follow.
3.1 Setup
Consider a set of states (s) choosing between candidates (c = 0;1;:::;C) in a sequential election,
where the order of voting is taken as given. We allow for the possibility that multiple states may
vote on the same day; in particular, let ￿t be the set of states voting on date t and let Nt ￿ 1 be
the size of this set.
Voter i residing in state s is assumed to receive the following payo￿ from candidate c winning
the election:
ucis = qc + ￿cs + ￿cis (1)
where qc represents the quality of candidate c; ￿cs represents a state-speci￿c preference for candi-
date c; and ￿cis represents an individual preference for candidate c and is assumed to be distributed
type-I extreme value and independently across both candidates and voters. We normalize utility
from the baseline candidate to be zero for all voters (u0is = 0): While underlying preferences
are assumed to be stable, or time-independent, there is uncertainty and expectations may evolve
during the election, as described below.
We assume the following information structure. Voters know their own state-level preference
(￿cs) but not those in other states. Voters do, however, know the distribution from which these
state-level preferences are drawn. In particular, we assume that state-level preferences are normally
distributed [￿cs ￿ N(0;￿2
￿)] and independently across states. We further assume that voters are
uncertain over candidate quality and are Bayesian. In particular, initial (t = 1) priors over
candidate quality (qc) are assumed to be normally distributed with a candidate-speci￿c mean
￿c1 and a variance ￿2
1 that is common across candidates. Under the assumptions to follow, the
posterior distribution will be normal as well. Before going to the polls, all voters in state s receive
a noisy signal (￿cs) over the quality of candidate c :
￿cs = qc + "cs (2)
where the noise in the signal is assumed to be normally distributed ["cs ￿ N(0;￿2
")] and inde-
pendently across states: These signals can be interpreted in a variety of ways, including personal
meetings with candidates, media coverage of candidate debates within the state, endorsements of
6candidates by either local media outlets or local politicians, political advertising on local television
channels, media coverage of candidate appearances in the state, etc. We assume that this signal
is common within a state but is unobserved by voters in other states.5
Given the state-level signal (￿cs); expected utility for voter i in state s from candidate c winning
can be written as follows:
E(ucisj￿cs) = E(qcj￿cs) + ￿cs + ￿cis (3)
Finally, regarding voter behavior, we assume sincere voting. That is, given the information
available to voter i in state s at time t, voters support the candidate who maximizes their expected
utility.6 We thus abstract from several forms of strategic voting under which optimal voter
behavior may depend upon the behavior of other voters. Importantly, these forms of strategic
voting can also generate momentum e￿ects that are unrelated to social learning, and this issue of
alternative explanations for any measured momentum e￿ects will be discussed more completely
below in the empirical application.
3.2 Voting behavior
Then, for voters in state s observing a signal over quality (￿cs) and with a prior given by (￿ct;￿2
t);
private updating over quality is given by:
E(qcj￿cs) = ￿t￿cs + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿ct (4)








5 We feel that this assumption of a common signal within states is reasonable given the role of the mass media
in modern elections. However, some campaign messages, such as mailings, can be targeted to individual voters,
suggesting an alternative formulation that would allow for voters within the same state to receive independent
signals. This formulation implies that, in the absence of heterogeneity in state-level preferences (￿2
￿ = 0); quality is
perfectly revealed by voting returns from states with large populations. Thus, voters will learn only from returns
in the ￿rst state and will ignore both their private signals and voting returns from other states thereafter. We view
this feature of a model with individual-level signals as both unattractive and unrealistic and thus focus on the case
of state-level signals. One could also consider a hybrid model with both individual-level and state-level signals.
While this formulation would overcome the problem of perfect revelation of quality after voting in the ￿rst state,
as described above, it is not clear how the variance in these two signals, which is a key parameter of interest in the
empirical analysis to follow, would be separately identi￿ed.
6 As noted above, these strategies are similar to those used in Ali and Kartik (2007).
7Re￿ecting well-known results in the literature on Bayesian learning, voters thus place more weight
on their private signal the higher is the variance in the prior over quality (￿2
t) and the lower is the
degree of noise in the signal (￿2
"):
Given this updating rule, aggregate vote shares in state s voting at time t can be described as
follows:
ln(vcst=v0st) = ￿cs + ￿t￿cs + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿ct: (6)
where vcst is the vote share for candidate c and v0st is the vote share for the baseline candidate.
Thus, the log-odds ratio can be expressed as a linear combination of state-level preferences (￿cs),
the signal (￿cs) received by voters in state s, and the mean of the quality distribution (￿ct) prior
to the realization of the signal, where the relative weight on the latter two terms depends upon
the parameter ￿t. As will be seen below, this expression for aggregate voting returns provides the
key link between the individual-level voting data and the aggregate returns in the econometric
formulation, and the linearity will be a particularly attractive feature in the analysis of social
learning from early voting returns.
3.3 Social learning and momentum
From the perspective of measuring momentum, the key question is then how voters in late states
update their beliefs over quality upon observing vote shares in early states (i.e. E(qcjvcst;v0st)).
Given that state-level preferences (￿cs) are unobserved by voters in other states, signals (￿cs)
cannot be inferred directly from vote shares in equation (6). Using the fact that ￿cs = qc + "cs;
however, we can say that transformed vote shares provide a noisy signal of quality:






where the noise in the voting signal includes the noise in the quality signal ("cs) but also the
noise due to the unobserved state preferences (￿ct=￿t); the combined variance of the noise in the
voting signal thus equals (￿2
￿=￿2
t) + ￿2
": Given Nt ￿ 1 such signals, the posterior distribution is
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Before describing the evolution of the mean of the belief distribution, we note that the precision
of the posterior, de￿ned as the inverse of the variance (1=￿2
t+1), is increasing in the number of states




To provide further interpretation of this social learning rule, it is useful to re-write equation (8)
as follows:





[ln(vcst=v0st) ￿ ￿ct] (11)
Social learning (￿ct+1 ￿ ￿ct) thus depends upon the surprises in voting returns, de￿ned as the
deviations in vote shares from expectations over candidate performance. Interestingly, this learning
rule implies that candidates who do not win the primary in state s can still bene￿t from momentum
e￿ects so long as they perform well relative to expectations. At the same time, candidates who
win primaries may actually experience reverse momentum e￿ects in the event that their margin
of victory is smaller than expected.
To provide a sense of the degree of social learning, note that the e￿ect of an increase in vote
















Interestingly, this parameter is less than one, re￿ecting the inability of voters in late states to
perfectly infer signals from vote shares in early states due to their inability to observe state-level
preferences of voters in other states. Relatedly, the social learning parameter is decreasing in the
degree of heterogeneity in state-level preferences (￿2
￿). Moreover, for the special case of single-state
primaries at time t (Nt = 1), such as in Iowa and New Hampshire, we can say that the degree
of social learning is decreasing in the degree of noise in the signal (￿2
") and is increasing in the
variance of the prior (￿2
t).
An important implicit assumption in the above formulation is that expectations over electoral
outcomes, as captured by ￿ct in equation 11, depend upon national, but not state-speci￿c, factors.
We make this assumption for two reasons. First, national polls reveal national preferences (￿ct),
while state-speci￿c polls reveal both national and state-level preferences (￿ct + ￿cs): Thus, with
both types of polls, voters can uncover state-speci￿c preferences (￿cs); and this inference would
9violate our assumption that voters cannot observe state-level preferences in other states. If voters
can learn state-speci￿c preferences, then the signal can be uncovered from voting returns in equa-





and equals one for single-state primary days (Nt = 1); such as Iowa and New Hampshire. Thus,
social learning would be assumed, rather than measured, in our empirical application to follow.
Second, while state-speci￿c polling data was often reported in the media for Iowa and New Hamp-
shire, polls in other states were reported far less frequently, if at all, and it is thus far from clear
that voters had this information for all states. National polls, by contrast, were readily available
on a high-frequency basis. Finally, we should note that this assumption (expectations depend
purely on national factors) is much stronger than we need, and we relax this assumption in one
of the alternative speci￿cations, which assumes that some state-speci￿c factors are observed and
that others are unobserved. What is crucial to our result is that state-level preferences are not
perfectly observed by voters in other states.
4 Empirical Application
Our empirical application focuses on the 2004 Democratic primary. During the months leading up
to the primary season, Howard Dean, governor of Vermont, held a substantial lead in opinion polls.
After his third place ￿nish in the Iowa caucuses, however, Dean soon lost that lead in opinion
polls to the Iowa winner, John Kerry, a senator from Massachusetts, and was forced to withdraw
after a disappointing performance in Wisconsin. Kerry continued his success in Iowa with a win
in New Hampshire and with strong performances in all of the subsequent states. The only serious
challenge to Kerry after Iowa came from John Edwards, a senator from North Carolina, who came
in a surprisingly strong second in Iowa and proceeded to win in South Carolina and Oklahoma.
Edwards was forced to withdraw, however, on March 3, the day after a string of second-place
￿nishes to Kerry on Super Tuesday.
4.1 Data
To measure the degree of social learning in the 2004 primaries, we examine reactions of voters in
daily opinion polls to candidate performance in primaries. Individual-level data are taken from the
National Annenberg Election Survey 2004, which conducted interviews on a daily basis beginning
10on October 7, 2003 and continuing through the general election in November 2004. Given our
focus on the primary season, we use voting intentions for 4,084 respondents who identify as likely
Democratic primary voters between October 7, 2003 and March 2, 2004, the day before Edwards
withdrew from the race. To be clear, these are respondents living in states that have not yet held
their primaries. Voters living in states that have already voted are not asked their voting intentions
in the survey and are thus excluded from our analysis. We focus on the campaigns of the three
major candidates: Dean, Edwards, and Kerry, where Kerry is considered the baseline candidate.7
Finally, as will be described below, we aim to estimate the state-speci￿c preference parameters
(￿cs) and thus insu￿cient data forces us to also delete respondents from the District of Columbia
and seven small states. These individual-level data are then merged with state-aggregate vote
shares from the 2004 primary season as reported on the website www.cnn.com.
Our identi￿cation strategy is illustrated in Figures 3-5 for the case of Iowa. As shown, Dean
had a substantial and stable lead over Kerry and Edwards during the month preceding the Iowa
primary. Dean under-performed in Iowa relative to expectations, as captured by pre-Iowa polling
levels, and voters in the Annenberg survey updated appropriately.8 Kerry, by contrast, outper-
formed expectations in Iowa, and survey respondents updated accordingly. Edwards also outper-
formed his pre-Iowa polling numbers and his polling numbers did increase following Iowa. After
a few days, however, his support fell back to pre-Iowa levels.9
7 Another candidate, Wesley Clark, was considered viable in the months leading up to the primary season. He
chose, however, to not participate in the Iowa caucuses and subsequently fell out of serious contention. Given that
we do not have a model of candidate campaign strategies and the possible negative signals sent by non-participation,
we felt it best to exclude him from the analysis. Another candidate, Richard Gephardt, polled well prior to Iowa
but withdrew from the race shortly thereafter.
8 This reaction in polling data to the Iowa outcome is somewhat confounded by Dean’s reaction, which was
dubbed the \Dean scream" and was televised extensively in the days following the Iowa outcome. It is important
to note, however, that this media coverage would probably not have occurred had Dean fared better in Iowa. That
is, the Iowa outcome and Dean’s reaction to that outcome are not necessarily independent events. In addition, the
votes that Dean lost went to Kerry and Dean, the winners in Iowa, rather than the losers, including Gephardt and
Lieberman. Thus, even if Dean’s vote loss was due to Dean’s reaction, the reallocation of those votes is consistent
with our story of momentum associated with social learning from aggregate returns.
9 These patterns are similar to those in prices from the Iowa Electronic Market, in which market participants
purchased contracts that pay $1 in the event that Kerry, for example, is the party’s nominee in the general election,
and the price of this contract can thus be interpreted as the probability that a given candidate wins the nomination
(Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). We choose to focus on polling data, rather than these prices from prediction markets,
for two reasons. First, the mapping from voting in primaries to the probability of nomination, as provided by the
prediction market prices, is confounded by the presence of superdelegates, which are not pledged to the winning
candidate, as well as the possibility that no candidate wins a majority of the delegates, in which case the nominee
is chosen through a bargaining process at the party convention. Second, the daily polling data, but not prediction
market data, include additional measures of candidate quality, and we will make use of these in our discussion of
alternative explanations in section 4.6.
114.2 Empirical Model
As noted above, our empirical strategy for identifying momentum e￿ects involves measuring re-
actions of voting intentions of likely voters in polling data to aggregate voting returns in state
primaries. In our econometric speci￿cation, we assume that these voters have not yet observed




d exp(￿ds + ￿dt)
(13)
To better understand our empirical strategy for estimating the parameters governing the learning
process, it is useful to ￿rst note that voter updating over quality can be summarized by the weight






































As seen, with information regarding the initial priors (￿c1;￿2
1) along with the parameters ￿2
" and
￿2
￿, one can compute the weight on the private signal in the ￿rst period (￿1) and, with this weight
in hand, one can then compute the weight placed upon the public voting signals in the ￿rst period
(￿1). Then, with the entire set of ￿rst-period values (￿c1;￿2
1;￿1;￿1); along with information on
￿rst-period voting returns, we can successively compute the second-period values (￿c2;￿2
2;￿2;￿2):
With these second-period values, along with information on second-period voting returns, we can
then successively compute the third-period values (￿c3;￿2
3;￿3;￿3), etc.
Thus, it should be clear that the key parameters to be estimated are the distribution of the
initial priors (￿c1;￿2
1) along with the variance in state-level preferences (￿2
￿) and the degree of
noise in the signal (￿2
"): These key parameters are estimated via a two-step approach. In the ￿rst
step, we use the pre-Iowa polls to estimate the initial conditions. In particular, for the case of




d exp(￿ds + ￿d1)
(18)
We estimate the state-level preference parameters (￿cs), which are normalized to sum to zero and
which can be used to calculate ￿2
￿; along with a constant term, which provides an estimate of
￿c1. In the second step, we use reactions of voters in post-Iowa opinion polls to the revelation of
voting returns in other states in order to estimate the key parameters (￿2
";￿2
1) governing the social
learning process. Given the two-stage estimation approach, conventional con￿dence intervals will
not re￿ect the uncertainty associated with using generated regressors in the second stage. We
address this issue by computing bootstrap con￿dence intervals.10
The key social learning parameters are identi￿ed by voter responses to the release of voting
returns in others states. If voters are unresponsive to the release of such information, this suggests
an absence of social learning, and the variance in the initial prior (￿2
1) will have a small estimate
or the variance in the degree of noise in the signal (￿2
") will have a large estimate. If voters are
responsive to voting returns, by contrast, then the variance in the initial prior (￿2
1) will have a
large estimate or the variance in the degree of noise in the signal (￿2
") will have a small estimate.
4.3 Baseline Results
Table 1 provides the results from the ￿rst-step of the estimation procedure. As shown in columns
1 and 2, the coe￿cient on the candidate-speci￿c constant term demonstrates Dean’s substantial
lead over Kerry and Kerry’s lead over Edwards prior to the commencement of the primary season.
As noted above, this coe￿cient can be interpreted as the mean of the initial prior (￿c1); and this
variable will play a key role in the updating rule given by equation (16). The signi￿cant degree
of variation in the state speci￿c coe￿cients demonstrates the signi￿cant diversity in preferences
for the candidates across states. As shown, there are strong regional e￿ects with Kerry holding
a substantial advantage in his home state of Massachusetts, and Edwards enjoying a correspond-
ing strong advantage in the South, with statistically signi￿cant advantages over Kerry in North
Carolina and South Carolina. This advantage likely re￿ects the fact that Edwards was the only
candidate of the three from the South. This issue of regional advantages will be considered below
10 In particular, we draw 100 samples with replacement from the underlying sample. In some replications, an
insu￿cient number of cases were drawn to allow for identi￿cation of the speci￿c state ￿xed e￿ects, and we thus
exclude such states from the analysis in these bootstrap samples.
13in an alternative speci￿cation, which relaxes the assumption that such advantages are unobserved
by voters in later states.
Table 2 provides estimates of the other key parameters. The degree of heterogeneity in state-
level preferences (￿2
￿) is calculated by taking the cross-state and cross-candidate variance in the
coe￿cients on the state dummy variables as reported in Table 1. As described above, the variance
in the initial prior (￿2
1) and the degree of noise in the signal (￿2
"), by contrast, are identi￿ed by
gauging the reactions of voters in the daily polling data to the revelation of aggregate voting
returns from state primaries. As shown, both of these parameters are positive and statistically
signi￿cant.
Given the di￿culties in providing a direct social learning interpretation of these parameters,
we instead present in Figures 6-9 the key dynamics of the model as implied by these estimated
parameters and the aggregate returns. As shown in Figure 6, for example, the degree of variance
in the beliefs over candidate quality (￿2
t) falls substantially over the primary season. Prior to the
Iowa caucus, the variance in this distribution was around 3.5, re￿ecting the estimated parameter
in Table 2, but falls to around 0.5 by March 2, or Super Tuesday. Thus, voters learn a substantial
amount over the course of the campaign about candidate quality purely from the release of voting
returns in other states.
At the same time as the degree of uncertainty over candidate quality fell, voters learned about
the quality of the candidates relative to one another. As shown in Figure 7, prior to the primary
season, voters viewed Dean as the highest quality followed by Kerry and Edwards, re￿ecting the
pattern of coe￿cients on the candidate indicator variables in Table 1. Following Kerry’s win in
Iowa, Kerry pulled ahead of Dean in terms of mean quality ratings. Although Kerry defeated
Edwards in Iowa, voters updated favorably over Edwards relative to Kerry, re￿ecting the fact
candidates can bene￿t, even relative to ￿rst place ￿nishers, from surprisingly strong second place
￿nishers. On the other hand, although Edwards defeated Dean in Iowa, voters still evaluated Dean
and Edwards roughly equally. This in turn re￿ects the fact that voters also placed some weight
on their beliefs prior to voting in Iowa, and these priors were strongly in favor of Dean relative
to Edwards. Following New Hampshire and mini-Super Tuesday, Kerry held a strong advantage,
and Dean never recovered from his weak performances in Iowa.
To provide further interpretation of these results, Figure 8 plots the implied weights on the
private signals observed by voters (￿t) as well as the weights placed upon aggregate vote shares
14after scaling by the number of primaries (￿t=Nt). As shown, voters place less weight on their prior
than on the private signal at the beginning of the sample period. This in turn re￿ects the fact
that the estimated degree of noise in the signal is less than the estimated degree of variance in
the initial prior (￿2
" < ￿2
1) and that the weight on the private signal can be shown to be inversely
related to the ratio of these parameters (i.e. ￿t = (1 + ￿2
"=￿2
t)￿1): As implied by the model, the
weight placed upon the private signal falls during the primary season and, by Super Tuesday,
voters place roughly 75 percent weight on their priors and only 25 percent on their private signals.
Figure 8 also plots the weight placed upon the revelation of aggregate voting returns in other
states during the primary season. As shown, voters initially place roughly 60 percent weight on
these signals and 40 percent on their priors; the fact that this weight on public information is
lower than the weight placed on the private signal re￿ects the inability of voters in late states
to perfectly uncover the signals in early states from voting returns due to the observation noise
associated with unobserved state preferences. As more and more primary returns come in, voters
place less weight on voting returns and more weight on their prior. By the end of the sample,
voters place almost all of the weight on their prior and are largely unmoved by developments in
primaries held in other states.
While the weights on private and public signals seem to fall in a similar parallel manner in
Figure 8, the weight on the public signal is quickly approaching zero, and hence the ratio of
these two weights (￿t=￿tNt); which is the key social learning parameter, also falls quickly to zero.
This pattern in social learning is re￿ected in Figure 9, where voters in late states initially learn
substantially from returns in early states. The initial weight on the public signal is roughly 75
percent of the weight on the private signal. This social learning, however, falls o￿ quickly and the
weight on the public signal is around 10 percent of the weight on the private signal by the end of
the sample period.
In summary, our estimated model demonstrates that voters in late states placed signi￿cant
weight on Kerry’s early victories. It is the deviations from expectations that matters, however,
and Edwards bene￿tted relative to Kerry from a surprisingly strong second-place ￿nish in Iowa.
While Dean came in third place in Iowa, he bene￿tted from strong voter beliefs regarding his
quality prior to Iowa and was able to remain viable. At the same time that voters shifted their
relative evaluations of candidate quality, they became increasingly con￿dent in these evaluations,
and voters in late states thus placed less weight on both their private signals as well from returns in
15other states. Taken together, these results demonstrate signi￿cant momentum e￿ects as re￿ected
in the e￿ect of early returns on the choices of late voters.
4.4 Implied Voting Weights
Due to these documented momentum e￿ects, early voters have a disproportionate in￿uence over
the selection of candidates. This over-weighting of early voters associated with sequential voting
thus leads to potential deviations from the democratic ideal of \one person, one vote." While
this property of sequential voting has been frequently discussed in policy debates over the design
of the primary system, there is little evidence on the degree of this disproportionate in￿uence.
Interestingly, we can use the estimated model to explicitly calculate the voting weights associated
with sequential voting in the 2004 primary.
Our ￿rst measure of voting weights is based upon the e￿ect of changes in state-level preferences




where vc is the vote-share for candidate c averaged across all states. In the absence of momentum
e￿ects, the impact of a change in voter preferences should be equal across all states. With
momentum e￿ects, by contrast, changes in voter preferences in early states will lead to changes
in vote shares in that period but in all subsequent states as well. We compute this derivative
for one state voting on each of the primary dates (t = 1;2;::;10) and, normalizing the in￿uence
of the ￿nal period to 1, this derivative provides a measure of the weight placed upon state-level
preferences.11 As shown in Figure 10, preferences of voters from the state of Iowa, the ￿rst state
to vote, have almost six times the in￿uence of the states voting on Super Tuesday (t = 10).12
Our second measure is based upon the e￿ect of changes in state-level information (￿cs) on
candidate vote shares:
11 In particular, we increase state-level preferences by one unit and re-compute vote shares for that state, as
expressed in equation 6. In order to predict vote shares for subsequent states, we re-compute the posterior mean
quality, as expressed in equation 8, and ultimately vote shares, as expressed in equation 6. Note that simulating
these vote shares requires explicit measures of the voting signal (￿cs), which can be backed out of equation 6 with
information over state-level preferences (￿cs).
12 A shock to a state in period t+1 may have a larger impact on overall vote share than a shock to a state in
period t, despite having a shorter duration. This is a result of the non-linear relationship between votes shares and
shocks, making the overall impact of a shock depend upon the pre-shock vote share. If we calculate weights using




As shown in Figure 11, the information held by Iowa voters has roughly 20 times the in￿uence
of information held by Super Tuesday voters. These information-based weights are substanially
larger than the preference-based weights, as described above, given that voters in late states
place less weight on their own signal. This under-weighting of signals has a direct e￿ect in the
calculation of voting weights but also has an indirect e￿ect as late vote shares are thus a noisier
signal of quality. Taken together, these results con￿rm the often-held notion that early states have
a disproportionate in￿uence over the selection of candidates in sequential primary systems and
thus represents a signi￿cant departure from \one person, one vote."
4.5 Additional speci￿cations
As noted above, the baseline model assumes that voters observe their own state-level preferences
but not those in other states. What is key to the social learning result is that some component
of state-level preferences is unobserved by voters in other states, and thus voters in late states
cannot perfectly infer signals from voting returns in early states. If preferences are perfectly
observed, then, as noted above, in the case of a single primary (Nt = 1), public and private
learning are equivalent (￿t = ￿t) and momentum e￿ects are e￿ectively assumed, rather than
measured. As an alternative to this assumption of perfect observability, we consider and estimate
a speci￿cation in which state-level preferences consist of both an unobserved component (￿cs) and
an observed component (Xcs), such as geography, which could capture advantages enjoyed by
politicians campaigning in their home states. Then, aggregate voting returns can be written as
follows:
ln(vcst=v0st) = ￿cs + ￿Xcs + ￿t￿cs + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿ct: (21)
where ￿ is a weight, or vector of weights, on observed preferences that will be estimated. It is then
straightforward to show that the social learning rule is adjusted for these observed characteristics
as follows:





[ln(vcst=v0st) ￿ ￿Xcs ￿ ￿ct] (22)
Thus, voters in late states incorporate these observed state-level characteristics into their ex-
pectations of candidate performance, and, in our example of geography, returns showing that a
17candidate performed well in his home state, even relative to national expectations over candidate
performance (￿ct); do not necessarily lead to momentum e￿ects.
To operationalize this speci￿cation, we incorporate into Xcs a measure of the distance between
state s and the home state of candidate c, where the measure is relative to the distance between
state s and Kerry’s home state of Massachusetts. After the ￿rst step, or pre-Iowa, analysis,
we regress the estimated ￿xed e￿ects on this distance measure and use the residuals from this
regression as an estimate of unobserved preferences (￿cs): As shown at the bottom of columns 3
and 4 of Table 1, distance has a negative and statistically signi￿cant e￿ect on voting decisions, as
re￿ected in polling data. After accounting for this observed dimension of preferences, the regional
advantages enjoyed by candidates are diminished although the home state advantage enjoyed
by Kerry and Edwards remains. As shown in Table 2, the estimated variance of unobserved
preferences (￿2
￿) is reduced in this model, re￿ecting the assumption that some component of
preferences are observed by voters in other states. The other key parameters are qualitatively
similar to those in column 1.
The second speci￿cation relaxes the assumption that underlying voter preferences are stable
over the campaign. Trends in candidate-speci￿c preferences could of course confound the estima-
tion of social learning e￿ects. To address this issue, we estimate a model with a candidate-speci￿c
trend (￿c) in preferences. Then, aggregate voting returns are adjusted as follows:
ln(vcst=v0st) = ￿cs + ￿ct + ￿t￿cs + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿ct: (23)
where t is normalized to equal zero on the date of the Iowa primary. It is then straightforward to
show that the social learning rule is adjusted as follows:





[ln(vcst=v0st) ￿ ￿ct ￿ ￿ct] (24)
Thus, voters in late states incorporate these trends into their expectations of candidate perfor-
mance. As shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1, the pre-Iowa trends tended to favor Dean and
Edwards, while Kerry was disadvantaged. Thus, at the time of the Iowa primary, the mean evalu-
ation of Dean and Edwards are higher than are those in the baseline speci￿cation. This is re￿ected
in the ￿rst row of Table 1. As shown in Table 2, however, the key social learning parameters here
are similar to those in the baseline speci￿cation.
184.6 Alternative Explanations
In the baseline model, we have assumed sincere voting, under which voters support the candidate
that provides the highest expected utility level. We have thus abstracted from strategic voting,
several forms of which provide alternative, non-learning explanations for our documented momen-
tum results. The ￿rst form of strategic voting involves electability considerations associated with
the general election. For example, consider a voter who prefers Dean over Kerry as president but
prefers either over Bush. This voter may learn that Kerry is more popular among other voters after
Iowa and thus has a better chance of defeating Bush in the general election; this voter may thus
switch to Kerry after Iowa, and this electabilty-driven switching provides an alternative explana-
tion for our results.13 The second form of strategic voting involves coordination and concerns
over wasted votes with more than two candidates. Consider a voter, for example, who ranks the
candidates as Edwards ￿rst, Dean second, and Kerry last. This voter may view Edwards as not
viable before Iowa and support Dean instead. After Iowa, Edwards becomes viable and this voter
may shift from Dean to Edwards. Again, this viability-driven switching provides an alternative
explanation for our results. The third form of strategic voting involves bandwagon e￿ects, under
which voters have conforming preferences and thus vote for the candidate expected to win. Again,
bandwagon e￿ects may mimic social learning and thus provide an alternative explanation for our
results.
Importantly, all three of these alternative explanations for our measured momentum e￿ects
involve learning about the preferences of other voters rather than underlying candidate quality,
as is emphasized by our social learning model. Thus, to distinguish between strategic voting
explanations and social learning explanations, we examine the dynamics of measures of candidate
quality, which we proxy by auxiliary questions in which voters evaluated candidates on a 1-10
scale for the following candidate characteristics: favorability, cares about people like me, inspiring,
strong leader, trustworthy, shares my values, knowledgeable, and reckless. These characteristics
can be interpreted as measures of candidate quality given that they are arguably traits that would
be valued by all voters regardless of ideology.
13 Note that electability considerations are not necessarily inconsistent with our results if primary voters believe
that the probability of winning in the general election is increasing in candidate quality. This could be the case,
for example, if independent voters are pivotal in the general election and place signi￿cant weight on quality. Then
primary voters driven by electability considerations will still value quality although the rationale for this preference
is somewhat di￿erent.
19More concretely, for each of these quality proxies, we run the following regression:
qualityitc = ￿c + ￿ ￿ ￿ct + ￿itc (25)
where ￿ct is the mean candidate quality at time t as implied by our estimated model and re￿ected
in ￿gure 7 and qualityitc is measured relative to Kerry. Under our assumption of sincere voting,
we would expect ￿ > 0, whereas, as argued above, there should be no link (￿ = 0) under strategic
voting explanations given that voters only learn about the preferences of other voters from early
returns.
As shown in Table 3, there is a strong link between these factors, providing support for our
social learning story. The ￿rst six measures have the expected positive coe￿cients under a social
learning story, whereas the coe￿cient associated with the measure of \reckless" has the expected
negative sign. The ￿nal two measures, however, are statistically insigni￿cant, likely re￿ecting the
reduced sample sizes.14 One important caveat of this analysis is that it does not rule out these
alternative explanations if some voters act in a sincere manner whereas others act strategically.15
Even if other motives are present, however, this analysis does provide strong support for the
presence of social learning among at least a subset of voters.
5 Counterfactual simulations
In order to further highlight the importance of momentum and social learning in sequential elec-
tions, we next provide two counterfactual simulations: simultaneous voting and alternative ordering
of states under a sequential system.
5.1 Simultaneous primary
We ￿rst consider an election in which every state votes in a simultaneous national primary on
January 19, 2004. In this case, vote shares in state s can be summarized as follows:
ln(vcs1=v0s1) = ￿cs + ￿1￿cs + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿c1 (26)
14 All respondents were queried as to candidate favorability but were then randomly queried as to the additional
traits.
15 Similarly, it could be that a given voter has a mix of motives and may care about both candidate quality and,
for example, bandwagon e￿ects.
20Accordingly, behavior in states voting after Iowa may be altered, relative to the sequential voting
returns, for two reasons. First, all voters use the pre-Iowa prior (￿c1): Given that voter priors
favored Howard Dean in the days leading up to Iowa, we thus expect that he would have performed
better in a simultaneous national primary. Second, at the time Iowa voted, voters were less certain
in their evaluations of candidate quality and thus placed more weight on their private signals
(￿1 > ￿t for t > 1). Thus, signals will be ampli￿ed in a simultaneous primary, and this second
e￿ect could bene￿t any of the three candidates depending upon the distribution of the realized
signals.
Table 4 provides the key results from the actual sequential primary and the counterfactual
simultaneous primary based upon the baseline estimated coe￿cients in tables 1 and 2. As noted
above, Dean dropped out of the race following the Wisconsin primary and we thus cannot calculate
counterfactual Dean vote shares for states thereafter.16 We thus run two counterfactual simul-
taneous primaries: one in which Dean is included but in which states after Wisconsin do not vote
and one in which Dean is excluded but all states vote. As shown in the Table 4, the results from
the counterfactual three-candidate simultaneous election demonstrate that the election would have
been much closer, with Dean winning in Michigan, Washington, Maine, and Nevada and Edwards
winning in Tennessee and Wisconsin. While Kerry would have won a plurality with 39 percent of
delegates, he did not win a majority and thus the eventual nominee would have been decided at the
convention. Similarly, the two-candidate simultaneous primary would have been much closer with
Edwards winning four states on Super Tuesday. We do not wish to over-emphasize the predictive
nature of the results from this simulation for speci￿c states, such as the surprising ￿nding that
Edwards would have defeated Kerry in Massachusetts.17 Rather, we hope that the heightened
competition under a counterfactual simultaneous election helps to further reinforce our ￿ndings
of herding in favor of Kerry under the sequential primary system.
5.2 Alternative sequential schedules
16 Of course, under a national primary, he would have been on the ballot in every state. But we abstract from
that issue given our inability to measure the signals for these states. Moreover, without a model of candidate exit,
it is di￿cult to predict how Dean would have performed in subsequent states following his decision to drop out of
the race.
17 This prediction of a win by Edwards in Massachusetts under a national primary re￿ects the fact that Edwards
did better than expected from the perspective of the econometrician given Kerry’s home state advantage and the
state of the race going into Super Tuesday. This in turn implies that voters in Massachusetts received a positive
signal regarding Edwards relative to Kerry and this signal is ampli￿ed when considering the signi￿cantly higher
weight placed upon signals at the beginning of the primary season, relative to the end of the primary season.
21Our second counterfactual election involves changes in the voting order under a sequential schedule.
To the extent that herding occurs under a sequential election, then the voting outcome may be
fragile, or sensitive to the order of voting. To investigate this issue, we randomly generated
alternative voting sequences, holding constant the number of states voting on each date. Again,
we consider a two-candidate election, in which all states are included, and a three-candidate
election, in which only states voting prior to and including Wisconsin are included. As shown
in Table 5, Kerry continues to win a plurality of states in most cases under both the sequential
two-candidate and sequential three-candidate elections. Using delegate weights, however, the
counterfactual sequential elections are somewhat more competitive, with Edwards winning 11
percent of the two-candidate sequential election schedules. Again, while Kerry still wins most
of these counterfactual elections, there are a sizeable number of cases in which Edwards would
have won. This is surprising given the wide margin by which Kerry won the actual election and
highlights the sensitivity of electoral outcomes to the sequencing of states.
6 Conclusion
Given our goal to develop a tractable empirical framework, we have kept the model simple and
have thus abstracted from many relevant features of electoral politics in the United States. We
thus view this model as a ￿rst step in a larger research agenda and plan to extend the environment
in a variety of ways in subsequent work. A ￿rst possible extension involves the media. While the
process through which voters observe signals was taken as given here, one could introduce a media
outlet that reports election results in early states to voters in late states. Then, possible applica-
tions include how social learning depends upon the intensity of media coverage both of the general
campaign and of the speci￿c candidates. One could also examine the interaction between social
learning and possible media bias towards speci￿c candidates and how this interaction depends
upon media credibility from the perspective of voters. Second, one could model candidate entry
and exit, which we have taken as given in this paper. Candidate exit would presumably depend
upon the degree of social learning, which may reduce the ability of trailing candidates to make
up lost ground in late states. Third, one could model the allocation of campaign resources, such
as political advertising and candidate visits to speci￿c states, as it is well-known that candidates
channel such resources into early states. Relatedly, candidates may alter their platforms towards
issues that are most important to voter in early states. Whether or not such strategies are e￿ec-
22tive presumably depends upon whether or not voters in later states condition on such candidate
behavior when analyzing voting returns from early states. Finally, one could conduct a welfare
analysis of simultaneous versus sequential elections. On the one hand, voters in later states have
more information under a sequential system and thus presumably make better choices. On the
other hand, signals in early states are over-weighted and, in the event that early signals are outliers
and thus not representative of candidate quality, then undesirable herding may occur.
In summary, we have developed and estimated a simple model of voter behavior under se-
quential elections. In the model, voters are uncertain about candidate quality, and voters in late
states attempt to infer private information held by early voters from voting returns in early states.
Candidates experience momentum e￿ects when their performance in early states exceeds voter ex-
pectations. The magnitude of momentum e￿ects depends upon prior beliefs about the quality of
candidates held by voters, expectations about candidate performance, and the degree of variation
in state-level preferences. Our empirical application focuses on the 2004 Democratic primary.
We ￿nd that Kerry bene￿tted substantially from surprising wins in early states and took votes
away from Dean, who stumbled in early states after holding strong leads in polling data prior to
the primary season. The estimated model demonstrates that social learning is strongest in early
states and that, by the end of the campaign, returns in other states are largely ignored by voters
in the latest states. Finally, we simulate the election under a number of counterfactual primary
systems and show that the race would have been much tighter under a simultaneous system and
that electoral outcomes are sensitive to the order of voting. While these results are speci￿c to the
2004 primary, we feel that they are informative more generally in the debate over the design of
electoral systems in the United States and elsewhere.
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Figure 11: Impact of shock to private signal by periodDean Edwards Dean Edwards Dean Edwards
Constant 0.938** -0.701** 0.938** -0.701** 1.404** -0.32
[0.773, 1.14] [-0.913, -0.433] [0.773, 1.14] [-0.913, -0.433] [1.108, 1.691] [-0.761, 0.125]
AL 0.64 1.114 0.676 0.75 0.642 1.119
[-0.427, 1.849] [-0.784, 2.697] [-0.38, 1.886] [-1.272, 2.301] [-0.382, 1.878] [-0.826, 2.662]
AZ 0.169 -0.316 0.123 -0.496 0.188 -0.313
[-0.716, 1.86] [-1.665, 0.973] [-0.742, 1.825] [-1.849, 0.703] [-0.716, 1.866] [-1.695, 1.105]
CA 0.071 -0.235 0.015 -0.377 0.134 -0.195
[-0.24, 0.425] [-0.813, 0.316] [-0.292, 0.376] [-0.946, 0.194] [-0.193, 0.495] [-0.775, 0.37]
CO -0.53 -0.737 -0.592 -0.881 -0.469 -0.744
[-1.219, 0.611] [-2.128, 0.559] [-1.246, 0.53] [-2.271, 0.432] [-1.113, 0.612] [-2.163, 0.591]
CT -0.103 0.028 -0.03 0.654 0.052 0.152
[-1.641, 1.345] [-1.088, 2.113] [-1.52, 1.414] [-0.214, 2.47] [-1.48, 1.534] [-1.047, 2.162]
DE -1.371* 0.749 -1.308* 1.075 -1.277 0.813
[-2.832, 0.239] [-0.863, 2.352] [-2.777, 0.305] [-0.667, 2.703] [-2.804, 0.685] [-0.742, 2.268]
FL 0.116 -0.141 0.195 -0.559 0.091 -0.177
[-0.32, 0.871] [-1.293, 0.718] [-0.205, 0.939] [-1.67, 0.36] [-0.342, 0.861] [-1.32, 0.696]
GA 0.332 0.835 0.405 0.444 0.315 0.797
[-0.578, 1.475] [-0.515, 1.971] [-0.528, 1.538] [-0.864, 1.525] [-0.524, 1.47] [-0.536, 1.954]
IA 0.014 0.348 -0.037 0.302 -0.054 0.313
[-0.674, 1.146] [-0.861, 1.606] [-0.713, 1.095] [-0.911, 1.581] [-0.78, 1.16] [-0.917, 1.572]
IL 0.23 -0.701 0.213 -0.837 0.258 -0.671
[-0.286, 0.975] [-2.29, 0.27] [-0.297, 0.944] [-2.395, 0.141] [-0.254, 0.961] [-2.295, 0.33]
IN -0.325 -1.202* -0.332 -1.31* -0.266 -1.145*
[-1.079, 0.446] [-2.349, 0.169] [-1.094, 0.433] [-2.408, 0.021] [-1.085, 0.542] [-2.282, 0.213]
KY -0.122 0.426 -0.111 0.165 -0.119 0.394
[-1.332, 1.006] [-1.049, 1.803] [-1.321, 1.018] [-1.215, 1.53] [-1.342, 1.024] [-1.095, 1.698]
LA -0.095 0.449 -0.062 0.046 0.046 0.573
[-1.255, 0.982] [-0.873, 1.621] [-1.228, 1.006] [-1.268, 1.284] [-1.136, 1.104] [-0.678, 1.74]
MA -1.346** -2.1** -1.195** -1.184** -1.27** -2.066**
[-1.885, -0.819] [-3.299, -1.194] [-1.706, -0.724] [-2.181, -0.22] [-1.799, -0.759] [-3.267, -1.091]
MD -0.195 0.066 -0.139 0.234 -0.158 0.11
[-0.938, 0.789] [-1.518, 0.95] [-0.836, 0.838] [-1.382, 1.086] [-0.844, 0.965] [-1.498, 0.994]
ME 0.25 0.004 0.197 0.604 0.233 -0.017
[-0.803, 1.524] [-1.18, 1.865] [-0.861, 1.476] [-0.367, 2.504] [-0.869, 1.545] [-1.167, 1.891]
MI 0.278 -0.244 0.204 -0.029 0.3 -0.285
[-0.339, 1.363] [-1.581, 0.975] [-0.404, 1.288] [-1.464, 1.142] [-0.38, 1.335] [-1.664, 0.985]
MN -0.038 -0.188 -0.138 -0.06 -0.039 -0.19
[-0.772, 0.803] [-1.951, 0.795] [-0.837, 0.72] [-1.806, 0.945] [-0.756, 0.807] [-2.015, 0.859]
MO 0.421 -0.007 0.399 -0.197 0.419 0.027
[-0.809, 2.074] [-1.555, 1.986] [-0.817, 2.055] [-1.703, 1.811] [-0.784, 2.107] [-1.552, 2.058]
MS 0.588 0.697 0.619 0.245 0.498 0.687
[-0.743, 1.594] [-0.367, 1.763] [-0.712, 1.622] [-0.701, 1.409] [-0.86, 1.669] [-0.454, 1.736]
MT -0.922 0.724 -0.995 0.742 -1.064 0.608
[-2.347, 0.47] [-0.706, 2.035] [-2.43, 0.374] [-0.627, 2.067] [-2.526, 0.319] [-0.787, 1.973]
NC 0.639 3.13** 0.714 2.717** 0.639 3.143**
[-0.51, 2.133] [2.005, 4.578] [-0.415, 2.184] [1.55, 4.179] [-0.523, 2.154] [2.017, 4.588]
NE -0.764 -0.445 -0.82 -0.522 -0.839 -0.474
[-2.817, 0.734] [-1.667, 1.094] [-2.868, 0.681] [-1.762, 1.035] [-2.73, 0.62] [-1.578, 1.043]
NJ -0.252 -0.491 -0.188 0.004 -0.208 -0.464
[-0.838, 0.73] [-1.688, 0.601] [-0.747, 0.819] [-1.352, 1.003] [-0.832, 0.828] [-1.689, 0.614]
NM -0.018 -0.458 -0.047 -0.667 -0.042 -0.442
[-0.921, 1.491] [-1.246, 1.888] [-0.95, 1.481] [-1.465, 1.644] [-1.096, 1.54] [-1.291, 1.866]
NV -0.368 -0.05 -0.422 -0.168 -0.377 -0.055
[-2.069, 1.411] [-1.189, 1.402] [-2.146, 1.375] [-1.286, 1.257] [-1.976, 1.224] [-1.11, 1.375]
Base Specification Includes Time Trend Includes Distance
TABLE 1: First Stage Multinomial LogitDean Edwards Dean Edwards Dean Edwards
Base Specification Includes Time Trend Includes Distance
TABLE 1: First Stage Multinomial Logit
NY 0.35 -0.911** 0.319 -0.391 0.397* -0.868*
[-0.078, 0.793] [-2.593, -0.01] [-0.116, 0.763] [-1.84, 0.476] [-0.025, 0.845] [-2.553, 0.022]
OH 0.124 -0.094 0.122 -0.115 0.154 -0.065
[-0.465, 0.955] [-1.175, 0.885] [-0.469, 0.951] [-1.18, 0.876] [-0.419, 0.989] [-1.163, 0.89]
OK -0.533 0.744 -0.541 0.431 -0.601 0.748
[-2.321, 1.008] [-0.656, 2.116] [-2.328, 1.004] [-0.888, 1.993] [-2.44, 0.983] [-0.63, 2.127]
OR -0.127 -0.669 -0.194 -0.67 -0.2 -0.741
[-0.963, 0.61] [-2.099, 0.644] [-1.055, 0.537] [-2.099, 0.653] [-1.021, 0.546] [-2.102, 0.619]
PA -0.231 -1.116** -0.213 -0.776* -0.204 -1.085**
[-0.649, 0.419] [-2.393, -0.117] [-0.638, 0.426] [-2.125, 0.164] [-0.671, 0.458] [-2.392, -0.096]
RI -0.527 -0.438 -0.393 0.409 -0.577 -0.458
[-1.642, 1.2] [-1.536, 1.127] [-1.494, 1.314] [-0.715, 1.713] [-1.751, 1.317] [-1.699, 1.187]
SC 0.908 2.031** 0.971 1.527** 0.898 2.05**
[-0.493, 1.986] [0.705, 3.389] [-0.434, 2.084] [0.244, 2.873] [-0.444, 2.015] [0.805, 3.357]
TN -0.115 -0.074 -0.073 -0.368 -0.069 -0.042
[-0.833, 1.216] [-1.434, 1.773] [-0.81, 1.257] [-1.942, 1.273] [-0.806, 1.297] [-1.416, 1.83]
TX 0.034 0.493 0.035 0.152 0.019 0.462
[-0.408, 0.663] [-0.319, 1.372] [-0.399, 0.665] [-0.645, 0.987] [-0.43, 0.673] [-0.333, 1.309]
UT 0.433 0.249 0.398 0.118 0.325 0.172
[-0.815, 1.35] [-0.866, 1.388] [-0.876, 1.309] [-0.981, 1.322] [-0.979, 1.331] [-0.871, 1.394]
VA 0.387 0.221 0.456 0.144 0.476 0.245
[-0.576, 1.175] [-1.397, 1.439] [-0.537, 1.214] [-1.493, 1.343] [-0.495, 1.208] [-1.313, 1.486]
WA 0.177 -0.287 0.082 -0.226 0.187 -0.284
[-0.408, 0.618] [-1.343, 0.681] [-0.51, 0.533] [-1.29, 0.734] [-0.383, 0.657] [-1.302, 0.726]
WI 0.207 -0.028 0.146 0.109 0.262 0.031
[-0.769, 1.083] [-1.35, 1.122] [-0.838, 0.975] [-1.21, 1.23] [-0.719, 1.091] [-1.295, 1.102]
WV 0.078 0.008 0.102 -0.048 0.038 -0.063
[-1.133, 1.659] [-1.322, 1.25] [-1.108, 1.698] [-1.336, 1.227] [-1.138, 1.631] [-1.333, 1.19]
Distance -0.062** -0.062**
[-0.103, -0.025] [-0.103, -0.025]
Trend 0.01** 0.008**
[0.005, 0.015] [0, 0.018]
[bootstrap 95% confidence interval], ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%Base Specification Includes Distance Includes Time Trend
ση
2 0.815** 0.707** 0.829**
[0.551, 1.194] [0.402, 1.05] [0.546, 1.192]
σ1
2 3.577** 5.421** 5.967**
[1.497, 7.129] [2.55, 23.572] [3.492, 14.178]
σε
2 1.197** 1.545** 3.987**
[0.062, 4.097] [0.26, 8.501] [1.619, 9.646]
Table 2: Estimated Parameters












Mean Candidate Quality 1.135** 0.468** 0.750** 0.672** 0.365** 0.601** 0.115 -0.130
[0.052] [0.136] [0.164] [0.153] [0.132] [0.136] [0.171] [0.196]
Dean -0.587** -0.583** -0.598** -0.429** -0.494** -0.706** -0.194 1.015**
[0.070] [0.189] [0.199] [0.187] [0.179] [0.197] [0.246] [0.294]
Constant 0.152** 0.381** 0.490** -0.194 0.026 0.303* -0.802** -0.242
[0.057] [0.160] [0.188] [0.175] [0.155] [0.162] [0.209] [0.236]
Observations 6374 965 991 972 962 954 488 479
R-squared 0.085 0.018 0.029 0.027 0.013 0.027 0.002 0.028
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
Table 3: Additional Measures of Candidate QualitySimulaneous (2 way)
State Period Date Dean Edwards Kerry Dean Edwards Kerry Edwards Kerry
IA 1 1/19/2004 21% 36% 43% 21% 36% 43% 46% 54%
NH 2 1/27/2004 34% 16% 50% 34% 15% 51% 23% 77%
AZ 3 2/3/2004 22% 11% 67% 24% 6% 70% 8% 92%
DE 3 2/3/2004 14% 15% 70% 27% 5% 68% 7% 93%
MO 3 2/3/2004 10% 29% 60% 7% 27% 66% 29% 71%
NM 3 2/3/2004 23% 16% 60% 29% 12% 59% 17% 83%
OK 3 2/3/2004 7% 49% 44% 8% 45% 47% 49% 51%
SC 3 2/3/2004 6% 56% 38% 4% 41% 55% 42% 58%
MI 4 2/7/2004 20% 16% 63% 60% 6% 34% 14% 86%
WA 4 2/7/2004 35% 8% 57% 92% 0% 8% 3% 97%
ME 5 2/8/2004 33% 10% 57% 86% 1% 14% 4% 96%
TN 6 2/10/2004 6% 37% 57% 2% 72% 26% 73% 27%
VA 6 2/10/2004 8% 31% 61% 3% 43% 54% 44% 56%
NV 7 2/14/2004 19% 12% 70% 73% 1% 26% 3% 97%
WI 8 2/17/2004 20% 37% 43% 38% 53% 9% 85% 15%
UT 9 2/24/2004 35% 65% 37% 63%
CA 10 3/2/2004 23% 77% 22% 78%
CT 10 3/2/2004 29% 71% 28% 72%
GA 10 3/2/2004 47% 53% 44% 56%
MA 10 3/2/2004 20% 80% 90% 10%
MD 10 3/2/2004 30% 70% 30% 70%
MN 10 3/2/2004 35% 65% 59% 41%
NY 10 3/2/2004 25% 75% 62% 38%
OH 10 3/2/2004 40% 60% 71% 29%
RI 10 3/2/2004 21% 79% 21% 79%
0 2 23 4 2 9 6 19
7% 28% 65% 34% 26% 39% 41% 59% Percentage of Delegates Won
Sequential Primary Simultaneous (3 way)
Table 4: Counterfactual Primary







Table 5: Sequential Elections with Randomized Order